Reports based on vessel-tracking data have renewed concern over the vulnerability of the cables that connect Britain to Europe and North America. The central dispute is whether slow-moving Russian fishing vessels are simply operating at sea or gathering the detailed seabed information needed for sabotage.

Right-leaning coverage says analysis of more than 500 instances of Russian trawlers lingering near cable routes points to a wider surveillance effort. One report says ministers have confirmed Moscow uses “commercial proxies” to threaten deep-sea infrastructure, and cites a NATO source who said some vessels “have never seen a single fish on their deck.”¹

A separate account, also drawing on tracking analysis, identifies 17 ships that spent extended periods moving slowly near charted cable positions. It says activity north of Scotland included 337 hours above the Atlantic Crossing 1 cable, and reports that a naval officer said a sonar-equipped remotely operated vehicle could map a seabed feature “with millimetre precision.”²

Both reports frame the pattern as preparation for a possible future NATO conflict, warning that damage to cables could disrupt financial services, hospitals, transport and communications. They also stress the strategic difficulty: an attack would require accurate knowledge of cable locations, while much of the infrastructure is exposed on the seabed.¹

But the allegations remain contested. Norebo and Murman Seafood, two Russian fishing companies sanctioned by the European Union over suspected espionage and surveillance, deny spying or acting for Russian security services. Britain has not sanctioned either company, and the reports note there is no law barring Russian vessels from surveying cables in international waters.²